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WHAT REALLY CHARACTERIZES 
EXPLANANDA: 
PRIOR ANALYTICS , I,30*
LUCAS ANGIONI
1.  In t roduc t ion
In a famous passage from Prior Analytics, I,30 in which Aristotle talks about find-
ing out the principles of sciences, he seems to be highly optimistic. For he seems 
to say that, if our empirical collection of facts in a given domain is exhaustive 
or sufficient, it will be easy for us to find out the explanatory principles in the 
domain. However, there is some gap between, on the one hand, gathering true 
predications and, on the other, finding out the explanatory principles in a given 
domain. It is far from clear how it could be easy for a scientific researcher to 
find out the appropriate explanations starting only with the exhaustive collec-
tion of facts in the relevant domain. In this paper, I argue that what seems to 
be a naïve optimism on Aristotle’s part is due to an inaccurate interpretation of 
some key sentences. Actually, my aim is limited to discuss how the key expres-
sion in the sentence at 46a25 should be interpreted: “the true characteristics of 
things” (“τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν”). It is important to evaluate 
the role this sentence plays in the overall argumentative context of the chapter. 
 * A version of this paper was presented in the conference “Experience and Reasoning in 
Scientific Methodology: Between Antiguity and the Early Modern Period”, in the Czech 
Academy of Sciences, Prague, May 2019. I am most grateful to R. J. Hankinson, Matyáš 
Havrda, István Bodnár, François Nolle, Gweltaz Guyomarc’h and Robert Roreitner for help-
ful comments and challenging questions. An ancestor of the paper was presented in Berkeley 
in 2015. I thank Klaus Corcilius, Timothy Clarke, James Lennox, Jan Szaif and Justin Vlasits 
for discussions. I also thanks an anonymous referee, and Jakub Čechvala for helpful advice 
at the final version. I thank CNPq for the Grant 305053/2017-5.
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But I have a modest aim in this paper. I will mainly focus on a traditional mis-
understanding of the sentence itself. The terminology in which that sentence 
has been phrased deserves more careful consideration: on a different – and, so 
I hope, more accurate – interpretation, Aristotle’s point would cease to look 
like a piece of naïve (or even silly) optimism. 
2 .  The  Pa s s age  and  the  P rob l em
This is the passage I will focus on, in one of its standard translations, with the 
most important expressions underlined: 
Consequently, if the attributes of the thing are apprehended, our business will 
then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations. For if none of the true attributes 
of things had been omitted in the survey, we should be able to discover the 
proof and demonstrate everything which admitted of proof, and to make that 
clear, whose nature does not admit of proof (46a22–27, JENKINSON’S translation 
at ROT).1
This is the Greek of the passage (from ROSS 1949): 
 [22]  ὥστ᾽ ἐὰν ληφθῇ 
 [23]  τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις 
 [24]  ἑτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παρα-
 [25]  λειφθείη τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἕξομεν 
 [26]  περὶ ἅπαντος οὗ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὑρεῖν καὶ ἀπο-
 [27]  δεικνῦναι, οὗ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν.
In what follows, my main focus will be the expression highlighted at 46a25 
(and something of what I will say will also apply to the expression at 46a23).
 1 It is helpful to consider other translations for contrast. Smith’s: “Consequently, if the facts 
concerning any subject have been grasped, we are already prepared to bring the demonstrations 
readily to light. For if nothing that truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of our col-
lection of facts, then concerning every fact, if a demonstration for it exists, we will be able to 
find that demonstration and demonstrate it etc.”; Striker’s: “so once it has been grasped what 
belongs to each thing, at that point we should be prepared to point out the demonstrations. 
For if nothing that truly belongs to the things has been left out in our collection of observa-
tions, we will be in a position to find the demonstration and demonstrate anything that admits 
of a demonstration, and where there cannot be demonstration, to make this evident.”
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This passage follows a previous remark in which Aristotle stresses the impor-
tance of experience in handing down the principles in each scientific domain 
(46a17–22). I will discuss how these two passages are related, but I start with 
focusing on the key passage itself. I hope no one would have too much diffi-
culty in accepting that Aristotle’s optimism about finding out the principles of 
scientific demonstrations sounds a little bit exaggerated – for any intepretation 
of what “principles” means in this context.2 Suppose both highlighted expres-
sions – “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον” at 46a23 and “τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων 
τοῖς πράγμασιν” at 46a25 – just mean “the attributes of the thing” and “the true 
attributes of the things”, as Jenkinson has translated them.3 Suppose – as several 
interpretations are prone to do – that “πράγματα” refers to the basic subjects in 
the domain, for instance, the Moon, the Sun (if we are talking about astronomy), 
or points, lines and surfaces (if we are talking about geometry) or animal kinds 
at any level of generality such as quadrupeds, birds, horses, humans (if we are 
talking about biology). On these interpretive assumptions, Aristotle would be 
talking about an amassment of true predications about the basic subjects within 
the scientific domain at stake – for instance, an amassment of true predications 
about the Moon, or about quadrupeds etc. 
Demonstrations, however, are something further than a mere amassment of 
predications and, most importantly, are something stronger than sound deduc-
tions. Demonstrations depend on explanatory principles: they must tell what 
is the appropriate explanatory factor that explains why the items expressed in a 
given conclusion are the way they are. Now, it is clear that finding out the ap-
 2 “Principles” (ἀρχαί) is used in many ways in Aristotle. Sometimes it refers to terms, 
sometimes to propositions. The principles from which one knows a given explanandum p in a 
scientific domain can refer either to the somewhat remote factors from which our knowledge 
of p starts (and on which our knowledge of p ultimately depends), or to the proximate fac-
tors that appropriately complete the full explanation of p (see BARNES 1993, 93 for a similar 
point: “Aristotle does not distinguish clearly between the principles on which a demonstrated 
conclusion ultimately depends and the premises from which it immediately derives”, my italics). 
The definitions of the primitive items in a given domain are good candidates for the former 
role, whereas the definition of the subject of a given explanandum is a good candidate for the 
latter role. But Aristotle sometimes seems to imply that “principles” can cover an articulated 
series of premises linking those two sorts of definitions. Be it as it may, the difficulty I am 
highlighting here survives for any interpretation of “principle”. For a view that seems to favor 
the first kind of principles, see GREGORIC – GRGIC 2006, 20–21.
 3 The same holds for “predicates” (as we find in LENNOx 2010, 70; LENNOx 2001b, 43; LENNOx 
2001c, 101), or “facts” (as we find, e.g. in HASPER – YURDIN 2014, 125; IRWIN 1988, 29–30; SmITH 
1989, 158). On the other hand, the expression “what (truly) belongs to”, as found in Smith’s 
and Striker’s translations, is more neutral – and open to be taken in the direction I want to 
defend in this paper.
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propriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum does not depend on mere 
deductive machinery, even if – as many have rightly highlighted – deductions are 
very helpful for an accurate mapping of the explananda.4 Besides other issues, 
explanatory relations – which are assymetric – might involve propositions that 
can be deduced from each other, so that the deductive relations between them 
are unable to track the nature and the direction of the explanation.5 Therefore, 
a scientific researcher must also select what is relevant to grasp and explain each 
explanandum, and this step goes deeper than the logical relations mapped by 
the method outlined in Prior Analytics, I,27–29.6 
My central point in this paper is to argue that, if the key expressions high-
lighted above are taken as standard interpretations take them, Aristotle’s optimis-
tic description of the heuristic success – from a mere collection of huparchonta 
to explanatory demonstrations – risks sounding naive and silly. If a different 
intepretation of the key expressions can avoid that unwelcome result, it is to 
be preferred. I will argue for an interpretation that delivers a more satisfactory 
description of the conditions for the scientist’s heuristic success.7
Three Terminological Claims
In order to argue for a different view of the passage, I will dwell on three points, 
which basically concern how Aristotle’s terminology must be understood in 
this specific context. I believe that each of my three points stands on its own, 
independently of the others. But they are strenghtened when taken together in 
a unified interpretation about the key expression at 46a25. I will argue in detail 
for each of the three terminological remarks – defending them against the ob-
 4 For a simple and sharp formulation of the gap between sound deductions and explanatory 
demonstrations, see STRIKER 2009, 207. A similar point is found in mCKIRAHAN 1992, 262–263. 
LENNOx 2001 (especially 2001a and 2001b) has done a monumental job in showing how the 
formal method developed in Prior Analytics, I,27–29 is useful for detecting or depurating the 
right sort of explananda – and, most importantly, he also highlights that the method is helpful 
for finding A-type explanations (which are preliminary), but not B-type explanations (which 
are ultimate and fully appropriate). A similar approach about historia is found in CHARLES 
2000, 328–329.
 5 I have argued for this point in ANGIONI 2018.
 6 Another issue – which I will not discuss in this paper – is whether exhaustiveness of the 
collection of facts is really helpful for finding out each explanation.
 7 For different approaches, see GREGORIC – GRGIC 2006, 20–21; SmITH 1989, 158–159; 
mCKIRAHAN 1992, 261–267; BRONSTEIN 2016, 125–126.
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jections that will naturally arise, presenting parallel cases etc. But first of all let 
me just announce them very briefly.
First, “πράγματα” in this context (46a25) does not stand for the basic sub-
jects within a scientific domain. The word “πρᾶγμα” is highly context-sensitive, 
but has a core meaning which is preserved in most (if not all) uses even if re-
ceiving specific forces according to different contexts: its core meaning is “what 
one is concerned with”. Now, when it comes to contexts of scientific research, 
one is ultimately concerned with finding out explanations. Accordingly, in 
most contexts where Aristotle is talking about scientific knowledge or research, 
“πρᾶγμα” picks up what one is seeking an explanation for – an explanandum 
usually formulated in predicative form, like these: triangles have 2R, the Moon 
is eclipsed, quadrupeds make their progression with alternated movement of 
their limbs, etc.8 
Second, what “ὑπάρχοντα” expresses in 46a25 (as well as in many other 
contexts) does not correspond to the generic notion of true predications, or to 
the generic notion of bare facts (expressed as predications). The employment of 
“ὑπάρχοντα” with dative complement in 46a25 is not equivalent to what is com-
monly found in the Prior Analytics as the standard expression of predicative facts. 
Rather, “ὑπάρχοντα” in 46a25 has the force of “characteristic features” and picks 
up a subset of true predicates – namely, those predicates (in the larger domain 
of predicates that hold of a given item) that are really important to characterise 
what is peculiar to the item that happens to be in question. 
Connected with “πράγμασιν” in 46a25, “ὑπάρχοντα” has the force of pick-
ing up those features that are important to characterise a given explanandum as 
such – for instance, the features (among the features that are true of triangles) 
that are important for triangles as having 2R; or the features (among the features 
that are true of quadrupeds) that are important for quadrupeds as having a spe-
cific way of progressing with alternated movements of the limbs. And so on.
Third, the adverb “ἀληθῶς” applied to “ὑπάρχοντα” in 46a25 is not mark-
ing the truth-value of the predications. Of course, sentences that express the 
important characteristics (“ὑπάρχοντα”) of explananda are true. But their truth 
is already encoded in the employment of the expression “ὑπάρχοντα”. The ad-
verb “ἀληθῶς” as modifying “ὑπάρχοντα” has the force of “really”, “deeply”, 
“most fundamentally”.
 8 Since I will resort to the last example several times in this paper, it is convenient to make 
clear that I am talking about the criss-cross (κατὰ διάμετρον, 712a25) movement of the limbs, 
as examined in Progression of Animals, 712a24–25ff.
LUCAS ANGIONI
152
The result of all this is that the whole expression “τὰ ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς 
πράγμασιν” in the context of 46a25 can be adequately paraphrased in the fol-
lowing way: “the features that most fundamentally characterise the explananda 
as such” or, in a more expanded way, “the features that are really important to 
characterise each explanandum as the explanandum it is”. 
The full details of the story will be fleshed out as I argue more specifically 
in favour of each of these three terminological remarks. A final summary about 
what this notion amounts to can be found in Section 8 (with a prelude in Sec-
tion 5).
3 .  Πρᾶγμα  a s  e x p l a n a n d u m  w i th  P r ed i c a t i ve  Fo rm
There is no room here to discuss all the uses of “πρᾶγμα” in Aristotle’s works. 
My purpose is to show that “πρᾶγμα” has the force of explanandum (with pre-
dicative form) in 46a25. I begin with emphasizing that the different forces the 
word comes to get in each occurrence preserve a core meaning and stem from 
the reinterpretation of that core meaning within a particular context. The core 
meaning of “πρᾶγμα” can be formulated at a very general level as “what exactly 
one is concerned with”. It is not necessarily inaccurate to translate many occur-
rences of “πρᾶγμα” with words such as “object” or “thing”. But, in doing so, 
it is necessary to keep in mind that “object” is actually a good proxy for “what 
exactly one is concerned with” (e.g., in a forensic sentence such as “the object 
of this process is the murder etc.”), and the same applies to several occurrences 
of “thing” (e.g., those in which things are opposed to words).9 
However, when it comes to Aristotle’s Organon, scholars are sometimes prone 
to take “πρᾶγμα” either in the sense of subject-matter (of a given discipline) or 
in the sense of subject of predication. Of course, I do not deny that “πρᾶγμα” is 
employed with the force of subject-matter or subject of predication in several 
contexts. But I resist against the comfortable temptation of taking these two 
senses or forces of “πρᾶγμα” as if they were the whole story. For the word has 
different forces stemming from its employment in particular contexts. 
Thus, in contexts where Aristotle is discussing definitions, “πρᾶγμα” stands 
for the definiendum as such (which also happens to be the subject of the defini-
tory sentence).10 In other contexts, the issue is what attributes of any sort can be 
 9 About πρᾶγμα (although in different contexts), see GREGORIC – GRGIC 2006, 9.
 10 See e.g. Topics, 102a4; 146a3; Posterior Analytics, 91b14, 93a13, 97b17; De Anima, 403b2. For 
a more complex case, in which the definiendum has propositional structure and the definiens 
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predicated of a given subject, and “πρᾶγμα” picks up that subject exactly on 
that aspect. However, there are several contexts in which what exactly one is 
concerned with has a predicative structure: in these contexts, instead of refer-
ring to a subject of predications (or a generic subject-matter), “πρᾶγμα” picks 
up a state of affairs, or a fact, liable to be expressed as a predication. This is 
conspicuous in Metaphysics 1024b17, where “πρᾶγμα” stands for the diagonal’s 
being comensurable or your being seated. But as that passage is controversial in 
many respects, I point to other occurrences that are more suited for my case.11 
A particular occurrence that is beyond controversy (at least as for the propo-
sitional structure of πρᾶγμα) is Topics, 112b1: Aristotle talks about “things that 
are of necessity, or for the most part, or however it may chance”. There are 
many disputes about the exact meaning of those expressions – “of necessity”, 
“for the most part”, “however it may chance” – but whatever they happen to 
refer to in this context has a propositional nature. 
Most importantly, in contexts in which Aristotle is discussing scientific expla-
nation, “πρᾶγμα” – while preserving the core meaning, what exactly one is concerned 
with – refers to an explanandum as such. This is uncontroversially clear in Posterior 
Analytics, 98b30, where “πρᾶγμα” is the correlate of “cause” (“αἴτιον”) and picks 
up that of which the cause is the cause. Given Aristotle’s previous examples in 
the chapter, it is a matter of dispute whether “πρᾶγμα” refers to the attribute to 
be explained (the major term of a demonstrative syllogism, e.g., “being eclipsed”) 
or to the state of affairs to be explained (expressed as the conclusion of a de-
monstrative syllogism, e.g., “the Moon undergoes eclipse”). But, in any case, it 
is uncontroversially clear that “πρᾶγμα” in 98b30 cannot be equivalent either to 
subject of predication (e.g., the Moon) or to the generic notion of subject-matter. 
The situation is similar in Posterior Analytics 71b11, where “πρᾶγμα” is again 
the correlate of “cause” (“αἰτία”). It would hardly make sense to correlate a 
cause or explanation with a subject-matter or with a bare subject of predica-
tion. In fact, a subject of predication cannot be correlated with a cause unless 
an attribute to be explained is ascribed to it (or is clearly presupposed in the 
context). But, in that case, it is inaccurate to say that we have a relation between 
the cause and that subject of predication. It is more accurate to say that we 
have a relation between a cause and one of the attributes of that subject, or a 
has a causal-triadic structure, see De Anima, 413a20, where “πρᾶγμα” refers to the definiendum 
but at the same time is correlated with the “cause” (αἴτιον), which points to the term that 
expresses the explanatory factor in the definiens.
 11 For discussion of Metaphysics, 1024b17, see CRIVELLI 2004, 46–50; CHARLES – PERAmATzIS 
2016, 106–112.
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relation between a cause and the predicative tie involving that attribute and its 
subject. What is ascribed to a cause is, therefore, an explanandum with predica-
tive form.12 Being so, it is not a surprise that “conclusion” appears in 71b22 as 
the correlate of “cause” in the place of “πρᾶγμα”. What exactly a cause is the 
cause of is the predicative tie between the subject and the predicate expressed 
in the conclusion of a demonstration. Thus, it is clear that “πρᾶγμα”, in 71b11, 
has the force of picking up the exact object/target of an explanation, in other words, 
an explanandum with predicative form.13 I submit that “πρᾶγμα” has exactly 
the same force in 46a25. I will argue for this claim with more detail in the next 
sections, for my strategy relies on a particular passage in which both “πρᾶγμα” 
and “ὑπάρχοντα” have been used in the same way as in 46a25.14
4 .  “Ὑπάρχε ι ”  and  “ὑπάρχοντα”
The expressions “ὑπάρχει” and “ὑπάρχοντα” have many uses in Aristotle’s works. 
A quick survey of some uses might prove helpful, although my purpose is not 
to furnish an exhaustive (or even a neatly tidy) list.15
1) “Ὑπάρχει” is used as an absolute verb (with no complement) with the 
force of exists, holds, occurs or results. A bunch of examples: De Somno, 455b22; 
Posterior Analytics, 95a4; 98a36, 98b2.29–30; Metaphysics, 1048a31. It is probably 
from this use that we should understand the next one.
2) The participle “ὑπάρχον(τα)” is employed to point to facts, or something 
similar; in this case, “ὑπάρχον(τα)” already encodes the notion of being the 
case or being true. Some instances: Posterior Analytics, 81b23; Nicomachean Eth-
ics, 1127a23.25; Generation and Corruption, 316a9.
 12 About the triadic structure of explanations, see Posterior Analytics, 90a5–14, 94a23–24, 
99a16–18; ANGIONI 2018, 160–161.
 13 I have argued for this point in ANGIONI 2016, 142–143 (see also ANGIONI 2018, 161, n. 6). 
Surprinsingly, I have then referred to APr. 46a25 as giving an occurrence of “πρᾶγμα” in the 
sense of subject-matter. But, on this last point, I have changed my mind.
 14 For “πρᾶγμα” correlated with “αἴτιον”, see also Metaphysics, 1093a4. Besides, I do claim 
that some controversial occurrences of “πρᾶγμα” which are normally taken in the sense of 
subject-matter must be taken with the force of a given explanandum with predicative form. See 
Generation of Animals, 748a9, Sophistical Refutations, 169b23, 171b17–21, 172a24. But there is no 
room to develop this point here.
 15 I will skip many uses that are not relevant for my purposes in this paper, for instance, the 
use of “ὑπάρχειν” as one of the modalities (Prior Analytics, 29b29), the participle “ὑπάρχοντα” 
in the sense of “properties”, etc. Section 9 will also highlight a further use (with the force of 
“apply to”) that is important to answer some objections.
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3) “Ὑπάρχει” is sometimes used as an absolute verb (with no complement) 
with the force of being previously given, previously available, where “previously” 
does not need to be taken in a strictly chronological sense. Some examples: 
Metaphysics, 1082b29 (counting as a process of adding a unit to the set of uni-
ties previously given); de Anima, 417b25; Parts of Animals, 640a23; Generation 
of Animals, 730b2. There will be more on this in Section 9, when I discuss an 
important passage from Historia Animalium.
4) The verb “ὑπάρχει” with a dative complement is used in the technical sense 
of “being attributed to”. This use is expounded and profusely employed in the 
Prior Analytics: putting some intricacies aside (see Prior Analytics, 48a40ff.), it is 
tantamount to “being predicated of” (κατηγορεῖται with genitive complement) 
and “being said of” (λέγεται with genitive complement). In this case, the verb 
expresses a relation between a predicate and a subject. I do not need to discuss 
the details of Aristotle’s notion of predication, such as the distinction between 
metaphysical predication and linguistic predication, the classification of predica-
tive ties etc. All I need is highlight that the core notion of “being attributed to” 
can be taken at a high level of generality as equivalent to the notion of “being 
true of”: saying that A is attributed to B amounts to saying that A is true of B.
However, the centrality of the notion of “being true of” in the Analytics as a 
whole (and more especially in the Prior Analytics) has overshadowed other uses 
of the verb “ὑπάρχει” with a dative complement. Some of these neglected uses 
– which I label (5) and (6) in the ensuing paragraphs – might prove very impor-
tant to understand Aristotle’s notion of scientific research and demonstration.
5) Sometimes the verb “ὑπάρχει” (or the participle “ὑπάρχοντα”) used with 
a dative complement has the force of “belongs to” in the stronger sense of “be-
ing suited to”, “being appropriate to”, “being fitted to”, “being tailored to”. 
Thus, in Nicomachean Ethics, 1165a30–33, Aristotle says the following in his 
discussion of potential conflicts between different kinds of friendship: “to kins-
folk, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens, and all the rest we should always try to 
accord what is proper, and should compare what belongs to each [τὰ ἑκάστοις 
ὑπάρχοντα] as befits closeness of relation, virtue, or usefulness” (IRWIN’S trans-
lation).
Now, “belongs to” is also a fair translation for use (4) of “ὑπάρχει”. How-
ever, in the passage just quoted, it is clear that “belongs to” in Irwin’s transla-
tion has the force of “is appropriate” to each person, considering exactly who 
they are, their characters, their social relationships etc.16 This use of “ὑπάρχει” 
 16 ROWE’S translation for “τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα”: “the standing of each”; Ross’/ Urmson’s: 
“the claims of each”.
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– which is not so rare as some would be tempted to believe – is closely con-
nected with the next one. 
6) Sometimes the verb “ὑπάρχει” (or the participle “ὑπάρχοντα”) used with 
a dative complement has the force of “being (most) characteristic of”, “being a 
feature that is important to characterize something as it is (as to distinguish it 
from its neighbours)”. This force stems from the notion of being appropriate 
or peculiar to a given thing, as encoded in the previous use.
Thus – to start with an example far away from the Analytics – in the Nico-
machean Ethics we find Aristotle saying that: “We must not consider a life that 
is vicious and corrupted, or filled with pains; for such a life lacks definite order, 
just as its proper features do” (1170a22–24, Irwin’s translation, my italics). 
The Greek expression for “its proper features” is “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ”. Now, 
as is clear from the context, the expression “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ” is not used 
to refer to every attribute that happens to be true of the vicious life. Aristotle uses 
the expression to refer to those attributes that are relevantly important to char-
acterise the vicious life as vicious and as lacking definite order. Actually, a vicious 
life shares many general attributes with the virtuous life – attributes that have 
no moral importance at all, or that are important in the practical sphere but 
do not play any role in distinguishing sorts of ethical behaviour. For instance, 
it is true of both sorts of life that they involve deliberate actions, or that they 
require using our lungs for breathing, that they are bound to terminate (for we 
are mortals) etc. Of course, all these attributes turn out to be completely irrel-
evant for any contrast between the vicious and the virtuous life. But they are 
true of the vicious life anyway. However, being true of is not what is encoded 
in that occurrence of “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα”. As Irwin has felicitously translated, “τὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα” encodes the proper features of the vicious life, i.e., those features 
that are most characteristic of it (and distinguish it from the virtuous life).17 
Thus, “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” is employed according to use (6) in 1070a24. 
Note, however, that, depending on the context, what is expressed in use (6) 
entails what is expressed in use (5). The context of Nicomachean Ethics, 1070a24 
does qualify as a context in which the entailment is clear: we might say that a 
characteristic feature of the vicious life is also appropriate to depict it as differ-
ent from the virtuous life. Even more importantly, what is expressed in use (6) 
 17 Other translations are not necessarily inaccurate, but risk flirting with wrong suggestions. 
See Ross’/Urmson’s: “its attributes”. Rowe’s translation (“the attributes that belong to it”) can 
presumably be taken in the same direction as Irwin’s, if “belong to” is understood in the sense 
of “being peculiar to”.
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actually entails what is expressed in use (4): a proper feature of the vicious life 
is also a true attribute (or predicate) of it. But this entailment must not lead 
us to forget that use (6) is indeed focused on something stronger than merely 
being true of a subject.
5 .  Wha t  Cha r ac te r i s e s  an  Exp l anandum
I argue that, in the expression “τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν” at 
46a25, the participle “ὑπάρχοντα” is employed according to use (6). Before ex-
plaining what exactly this claim amounts to, let me address – in a preliminary 
way – a plausible objection one might raise. It is conspicuous that “ὑπάρχει” 
has been used in Prior Analytics (including chapter I,30) according to use (4), 
namely, as equivalent to the notion of “being predicated of” or “being true of”. 
One might argue that it is highly implausible that the same verb shifts from use 
(4) to use (6) within the same chapter. However, as I will develop in section 9, 
there are important parallel cases in which the same verb shift from one use to 
another within a short string of sentences. Furthermore, and more importantly, 
the shift is completely squared with its context. Scholars have been precipitate 
when they assume that shifting from one use to another within a short string 
of sentences is necessarily tantamount to spoiling the validity of an argument. 
(More on this in Section 9).
As I said, the participle “ὑπάρχοντα” with dative complement in 46a25 is 
employed according to use (6). If, as I have argued, the dative complement “τοῖς 
πράγμασιν” refers to explananda in predicative form (instead of referring to 
mere subjects of predication within the domain), my claim amounts to saying 
that “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν” in 46a25 should be understood with the 
force of “proper features of the explananda”. Given that the context of 46a25 
is concerned with describing the phenomena in a way that help find explana-
tory demonstrations, “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν” also encodes the idea of 
“features that are appropriate to describe each explanandum as the explanandum 
it actually is”. In other words, the notion of being a proper characteristic, as ex-
pressed in use (6), entails the notion of being appropriate, as expressed in use (5).
Now, the identity of an explanandum with predicative form depends not 
only on its subject-component, but also (and more importantly) on its attrib-
ute-component. For instance, if what we want to explain is why quadrupeds 
move their limbs alternately, it is clear that what our explanandum is (in other 
words, its identity as an explanandum within a given science) depends not only 
on the fact that quadrupeds is its subject-component, but also on the fact that 
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moving their limbs alternately is its attribute-component – and the role played by 
the attribute-component is the most important. For this attribute-component 
distinguishes our explanandum from other sorts of explananda we might con-
sider about quadrupeds – for instance, why quadrupeds do not have wings, or 
why most quadrupeds are able to run etc. 
Thus, the features that are important to characterise each explanandum as 
the explanandum it exactly is do not coincide with the notion of true attributes 
of the basic subjects of the domain. Consider, just for the sake of argument, 
that “quadrupeds” names a group of basic subjects in the domain of the science 
of animal locomotion. Many attributes are true of quadrupeds – including at-
tributes that are completely irrelevant for the science of animal locomotion.18 
But even if we confine ourselves to the subset of attributes that are in general 
relevant for the science of animal locomotion (i.e., the attributes that are ap-
propriate to the subject-matter), it is not the case that any chance attribute from 
that subset qualifies as important to characterise the explanandum in question. 
In order to attain the features that are important to characterise our explanan-
dum as the explanandum it actually is, we must be very selective: we must fo-
cus on the attribute to be explained (namely, moving their limbs alternately 
in progressing) and select from the set of true attributes of quadrupeds those 
that turn out to be important to characterise quadrupeds as moving their limbs 
alternately. In a context like this, it would not be a good idea to pay attention 
to the fact that quadrupeds are blooded animals or have head and tail located 
at the opposite limits of the body. These two attributes, even being important 
in the overall science of animal locomotion, will not help the researcher to fix 
the exact identity of the explanandum in question. The former is important to 
explain why quadrupeds have exactly four limbs (cf. 707a19–23), whereas the 
latter might be important to explain why quadrupeds’ standard movement is 
forward but not backwards (cf. 706b28–32). But they will not play any decisive 
role in understanding what is most characteristic of the explanandum in ques-
tion (viz., alternate movement of the limbs in progressing).
Thus, the research procedure Aristotle suggests at the end of Prior Analytics, 
I,30 is far from being a mere exhaustive inventory of true predications about 
the basic subjects in the relevant domain. Of course, such an inventory will be 
very helpful (or even absolutely necessary in some cases) for the success of the 
 18 It is necessarily true of quadrupeds, for instance, that they are different from circles. Of 
course, being different from circles is not relevant for the science of animal locomotion, but 
it is important to keep in mind that it is necessarily true of quadrupeds any way.
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research. But Aristotle is pointing to a more advanced step in the scientific re-
search. Aristotle is pointing to the explanatorily-sensitive selection of features 
that turn out to be really important to characterise each explanandum as the 
explanandum it is. There will be more on this below. But first I will support 
my point by examining a passage from Rhetoric, II,22 in which a similar move 
is made with strikingly similar terminology. 
6 .  “Τὰ  ὑπάρχοντα”  in  R h e t o r i c ,  I I , 22
Rhetoric, II,22 is about how to look for enthymemes – more precisely, how to 
select premises for the three sorts of enthymemes.19 The key expression “τὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα” appears first in 1396a6: Aristotles says that one who looks for rhe-
torical arguments of any kind must know (and have ready at hand) τὰ ὑπάρχοντα 
concerning the item the argument is targeting (1396a4–6). The expression has 
been translated as “facts”.20 There is nothing wrong with τὰ ὑπάρχοντα being 
facts – for use (6) of the expression entails what is encoded in use (1) and (2). 
But the translation is not accurate enough. For, when Aristotle develops what 
he exactly means, it becomes clear that he is talking about those facts that turn out 
to be relevant or important for the target envisaged in the argument. For instance, 
if we are going to advise the Athenians on whether they must engage in a war 
or not, we must know relevant facts such as what is the real power of Athens’ 
military forces (e.g., navy, infantary etc.), who are their enemies and allies, what 
wars they have fought previously etc. (1396a7–12). Now, relevant facts are in-
deed facts. But the stress is not on their being facts (as opposed to fictions, or 
to false opinions etc.), but on their being relevant for the target in question.
Note that it is possible to present the target of the rhetorical argument as a 
problem in subject-predicate form: “whether Athenians must engage in this war 
or not?” Note that Aristotle’s examples of ὑπάρχοντα are not whatsoever facts 
about Athenians, but those facts that turn out to be relevant for the problem 
in question, whether they must fight this war or not. Aristotle does not recom-
mend to select general facts such as that Athenians are Greeks, or that Atheni-
ans are human beings, or how many temples they have built in the last decade. 
Aristotle is prescribing a problem-sensitive selection of attributes. 
 19 I do not need to discuss what exactly an enthymeme is: I will rest on the minimal assump-
tion that an enthymeme is an argument. For discussion, see BURNYEAT 1996; RAPP 2016.
 20 See Roberts’ translation in the Revised Oxford Translation.
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This becomes even more clear in a passage further ahead (1396b3–18). Aris-
totle’s example is an eulogy to Achilles. If one should praise Achilles, one must 
not concentrate on facts that Achilles shares in common with other heroes or 
even with other humans. For instance, one must not build her eulogy with say-
ing that Achilles is a human being, or that Achilles is a demi-god, or that Achil-
les was involved in the Troy expedition, for he shares all those attributes with 
Diomedes and, presumably, many others (1396b10–18). The passage makes it 
clear that “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” refers to features that are appropriately relevant for 
the target in question – instead of referring to facts in general or to every at-
tribute that belongs to the subject-term at stake.
Aristotle’s employment of “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” is consistent throughout the 
chapter – from its first part (cf. 1396a6.15.22) to the section that ends with the 
case of Achilles’ eulogy (cf. 1396a27.32; b2.7.9). In all those occurrences, the 
force of “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” is more accurate than “facts” or “things that are true 
of the subject-term” of the target of the argument: “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” refers to 
those facts that, being indeed true of the subject-term targeted in the argument, 
have additionally some important connection with the predicate targeted in the 
argument and thereby turn out to be relevant for settling the problem (or be-
ing successful in the eulogy).21
Now, one might be tempted to resist against these claims due to well-en-
trenched prejudices about some key expressions, such as “πρᾶγμα” and “περὶ 
ὧν ὁ λόγος” (“what the argument is about”) in 1396b7: one might be inclined 
to take for granted that those expressions refer to the subject-term of the prob-
lems in question – for instance, to the Athenians – instead of referring to the 
question whether Athenians must engage in this war or not.22 However, if we are 
discussing whether Athenians must engage in this war or not, we are allowed to 
say that this question is the very thing our argument is about. By the same reason, 
this question is what we are exactly concerned with in the argument – this ques-
tion is our πρᾶγμα.
 21 In the case of eulogies, the target does not seem to have a clear-cut predicative structure 
as in the other cases. Forensic rhetoric discusses (e.g.) whether this man has killed or not 
(or whether his killing another man was just or not); deliberative rhetoric discusses whether 
Athenians must fight this war or not. It is true that eulogies does not start with a target so 
clear as this one. But Aristotle’s point presupposes that an eulogy, focused on an individual, 
is going to praise that individual’s deeds and qualities and, therefore, will have an aim that 
clearly has a subject-predicate structure. 
 22 And one might support her objection by pointing to Posterior Analytics, 76b22 and 77a78, 
where “περί” (either with accusative or genitive complement) seems to indicate the minor term 
of demonstrations.
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Thus, Aristotle says that being successful in every sort of rhetorical argument 
requires a target-sensitive attitude in selecting our premises:
One must not keep an eye on items of an indefinite sort [ἀόριστα],23 but on 
features that characterise [or are suited to] the problem the argument is about 
[τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος]; one must select the largest number of these 
characteristic features, and those which are nearest to what one is exactly con-
cerned with [ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος] (1396b6–8, my translation).
I take the expression “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” (in 1396b7) as having an implied dative 
complement (see explicit complements at 1396a17.21.32) – and this complement 
is the implied antecedent of the relative pronoun in the clause “περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος”, 
so that the full syntax can be represented as “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα [τούτοις] περὶ ὧν ὁ 
λόγος”. And presumably the expression “τοῖς πράγμασιν” is what Aristotle would 
have employed to make explicit what is implied as the dative complement of 
“τὰ ὑπάρχοντα”, for it is not by chance that “πράγματος” pops up in 1396b9. 
As we all know, this is natural Greek. Thus, the expression “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ 
ὧν ὁ λόγος” picks up those features that are important for the problem or the 
target of the argument – features that thereby turn out to be suited to settle the 
question (whether Athenians must engage in this war or not, whether justice is 
good or not) or to build the appropriate eulogy.24
Actually, Aristotle has made his point very clearly just some lines before the 
passage quoted above, although the editor’s punctuation can mislead the reader 
(1396a31). Aristotle said that it makes no difference whether we are discussing 
Athenians or Spartans, humans or gods. The same recommendation holds: we 
must take τὰ ὑπάρχοντα as premises (1396a26–27), for any of the three sorts of 
rhetorical argument. He then proceeds to an overarching remark:
The point holds similarly for whatsoever issue we are concerned with [περὶ πράγματος 
ὁτουοῦν] – for instance, one must argue about whether justice is good or not good 
from the relevant features of justice and from the relevant features of the good 
[ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ] (1396a30–33, my translation). 
 23 See the analogy with 46a12–15. However, in 46a12–15 Aristotle recapitulates the precepts 
of the topic-neutral method developed in Prior Analytics, I,26–28. In Rhetoric, II,22, as well 
as in the second part of Prior Analytics, I,30, Aristotle recommends to go further into the 
specificities of the problem in question.
 24 Aristotle presupposes a distinction between common and specific topoi (see BOLTON 1994, 
128), but his point goes further than that.
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Now, the comma between “περὶ δικαιοσύνης” and “εἰ ἀγαθὸν” in 1396a32 (as 
found in Ross’, Kassel’s and Bekker’s edition) can mislead the reader into think-
ing that the pragma is the bare subject-term involved in the problem, or is the 
generic notion of subject-matter – namely, justice (or, for the other examples, 
Athenians, Achilles, and so on) – instead of being the problem itself, namely 
whether justice is good or not good. But it is only entrenched prejudices about Aris-
totle’s terminology that can (mis)lead us into taking for granted that “πρᾶγμα” 
always (and independently of context) refers to the bare subject-term of a predi-
cation or to the generic notion of subject-matter. Actually, “πρᾶγμα” in 1396a31 
clearly picks up the question “whether justice is good or not good”, which has 
a predicative structure (“περὶ δικαιοσύνης” being the prosleptic formulation of 
the subject of the question “εἰ ἀγαθὸν”). This question, after all, is what one is 
exactly concerned with, and what exactly the argument is about. It is similarly 
clear that “ὑπάρχοντα” – which refers to what Aristotle recommends to select as 
premises – ranges over both terms of the predicative question: τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are 
not only features of the subject-term, justice, but also features of the predicate-
term, good. And this is exactly what we should expect, if “πρᾶγμα” stands for 
the problem we are exactly concerned with. 
This survey of Rhetoric II,22 shows that Aristotle employs the expression 
“τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” with dative complement in a very specific way. His claim does 
not embrace all the features that are true of the subject-term involved in the 
problem (or of the subject-matter of the eulogy). Aristotle is pinpointing those 
features that, having a relevant connection with the predicate-component of 
the problem, thereby turn out to be suited for handling the problem. As for 
eulogies, Aristotle is referring to those characteristics that (i) belong to a set of 
true attributes of the targeted subject, e.g., Achilles, (ii) but, differently from 
several other attributes within that set, are not shared with other subjects – so, 
extensionally, are peculiar to the subject at stake (cf. ἴδια, 1396b14); (iii) and 
really promote the specific target of the desired speech. 
In sum, “ὑπάρχοντα” (with dative complement) in Rhetoric II,22 is employed 
according to uses (6) and (5) and, most importantly, its (explicit or implied) da-
tive complements stand for problems with subject-predicate structure. Having 
such and such allies is a characteristic feature of Athenians, of course – but, more 
specifically, of Athenians inasmuch as they are considered as the subject of that particular 
problem. What makes the feature properly characteristic and appropriate is the fact 
that Athenians are being considered in this particular way – which depends on 
the predicate-component of the problem. If the context were different, that true 
attribute of Athenians’ would turn out to be irrelevant. For instance, if one were 
interested in the question whether Athenians must build a monument in honour 
of Plato, the feature of having this or that military ally would become irrelevant. 
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Having such and such allies is a true attribute of Athenians. But it only turns 
out to be a characteristic one in the context of the problem in question, namely, 
when Athenians are regarded in the light of the predicate targeted in the prob-
lem. Importantly, being a characteristic feature of Athenians inasmuch as they 
are considered in the light of that particular problem implies being appropriate 
for dealing with that problem. And this is exactly what Aristotle means in Rhetoric 
II,22, where “ὑπάρχοντα” is, therefore, employed according to uses (6) and (5).
 Note, however, that uses (6) and (5) entail what is expressed in uses (4), 
(1) and (2). If A is a characteristic feature of Athenians that turns out to be spe-
cifically relevant and important for settling the problem the argument is about, 
then it follows that A is a predicate that holds of Athenians, and it also follows 
that A can be depicted as a fact about Athenians. These entailment relations 
might have misled scholars into thinking that Aristotle was primarily focused 
on uses (1), (2) and – especially important for Prior Analytics I,30 – use (4).25 
Now, it is important to stress these entailments, for, in claiming that Aristotle 
employs the expression “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀληθῶς τοῖς πράγμασιν” according to 
uses (6) and (5), I am not thereby denying that the same expression does indeed 
pick up true attributes of their subjects and facts about their subjects. What I 
do claim is that those weaker forces of “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” cannot make good sense 
of Aristotle’s point in Prior Analytics I,30, for they make Aristotle’s optimistic 
remark sound exaggerated, naïve or even silly.
7.  The  Adve rb  “ἀληθῶς”  in  46a25
There is still one terminological issue to address: the force of the adverb “ἀληθῶς” 
in the key expression “τὰ ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν” in 46a25. We find 
several uses of the adverb “ἀληθῶς” and cognate words in Aristotle’s treatises. 
These uses can be helpfully classified into two main groups. I do not intend to 
offer an exhaustive and tidy classification, but only one that suits my limited 
purposes here.26 
 25 ROSS 1949, 396, talks in terms of “premisses suitable to each subject”, which could be 
interpreted as equivalent to “explanatory factors appropriate to each explanandum”; but, as 
Ross proceeds, it becomes clear that he was thinking in “facts”, and that “premisses suitable 
to each subject” is taken by him as equivalent to premisses that “state attributes peculiar to 
the science in question”. 
 26 In order to concentrate on what is important here, I will skip the use of these words to 
refer to sincerity or veracity as an ethical phenomenon. See Nicomachean Ethics, 1108a20, and 
IV,7 (especially 1127a23–26.30ff.).
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The first group is organised around the employment of “ἀληθής, ές” as a 
mark of the truth of sentences or propositions. As is well known, there is one use 
of “true” in Aristotle’s works in which the notion is applied to propositions or 
sentences that say “that what is is or that what is not is not”.27 The paradigmatic 
case in Aristotle’s theory of truth is the predicative proposition. It is presum-
ably from this case that those adjectives are also applied to mental states (or 
propositional attitudes) that have propositions as (at least part of) their objects. 
So, Aristotle speaks of beliefs and opinions as being true, and he does the same 
with other higher cognitive states such as practical wisdom (φρόνησις), scien-
tific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), intelligence (νοῦς) and even productive competence 
(τέχνη).28 I need not discuss whether “true” has exactly the same force when 
applied to bare propositions (like the one expressed in “Socrates is seated”) and 
when applied to a cognitive achievement such as demonstrative knowledge. All 
I need here is highlight that the application of “true” to scientific knowledge 
(and other cognitive states) presumably stems from the application of “true” to 
propositions, even if it is not reducible to that.
Another group of uses of “ἀληθής, ές” and related words can be more easily 
understood if taken together with its opposite, “ψευδής, ές” (false). Aristotle fol-
lows common usage when he applies the adjective “ψευδής, ές” to things such 
as fake gold. It is possible to relate this use to the previous one, of course: the 
point of calling fake gold false probably derives from the fact that the proposi-
tion saying that this is gold is false. But the way of employing the terminology 
is different. Importantly, Aristotle applies this second use to things like argu-
ments that produce a false appearance of being successful (i.e., valid, sound, 
convincing or explanatorily appropriate).29 By contrast, the adjective “ἀληθής, 
ές” applied to a given argument (or argumentative move) S means that S is re-
ally successful in delivering its appropriate result (instead of only appearing so 
without being so).30 
However, there is still room for a further distinction within this group. 
I have started with a picture in which “true” is applied to genuine cases of F 
in contrast with “false” applied to counterfeits – without there being any sort 
 27 See Metaphysics, 1011b27. For an extensive study, see CRIVELLI 2004.
 28 See, e.g., Posterior Analytics, 88b37–89a2, 100b5–8; Nicomachean Ethics, 1139b15–17, 
1140b5.20–21.
 29 See Topics, 162b3–15 (for a useful survey, see SmITH 1997, 147–148), and also 160b30.
 30 In this sense, Aristotle talks of “true syllogism (or deduction)” (Sophistical Refutations, 
171a11), “true solutions” (176a22, cf. 1402b23) and “true refutations” (175b2) – “genuine” being 
a good equivalent for this use of “true”.
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of gradation in the intensity of being F. But there are cases in which the adjec-
tive “ἀληθής, ές” (and cognate expressions) works as a sort of intensifier. Thus, 
someone employs “ἀληθής, ές” to mean that a given S is a real (or most funda-
mental) F without implying that the cases to which “ἀληθής, ές” is not applied 
are mere counterfeits. There are plenty of parallel cases in modern languages. In 
Portuguese, particularly, the adjective “verdadeiro (a)”, which is a straightforward 
translation of “ἀληθής, ές”, can work exactly in the same way. In English, the 
story probably runs better with “real, really” (if not with “true”, “truly”): saying 
that the real samba is found in Rio de Janeiro means that Rio’s samba is the 
sort of samba that is most fundamentally samba – without implying that the 
samba found in other Brazilian places are mere counterfeits (jokes apart): they 
are, instead, instances of samba of an inferior rank. It is the same story when 
we apply those expressions to a beer, a delicacy etc. When we say “this is really 
beer”, we are praising the high qualities of that beer and thereby putting it in 
the higher ranks without implying that other beers which are not so good as 
that one are not beer at all but a different drink (again, jokes apart).
Sometimes it is difficult to find the border between these two uses of 
“ἀληθής, ές”. For instance, when Aristotle says that friendship based on the 
goodness of character is the true (or real) friendship, it is a matter of dispute 
whether he implies that the other forms of friendship are so called only by ho-
monymy or by being inferior kinds of friendship.31 But there are cases in which 
the use of the expressions as intensifiers (not opposed to mere counterfeits or 
homonyms) is clear enough.32 And I argue that the occurrence of “ἀληθῶς” in 
46a25 is one of the latter cases.
8 .  Wha t  R ea l l y  Cha r ac te r i z e s  an  Exp l anandum  
(And I s  Appropr i a te  to  Gra sp ing  i t  
a s  the  Exp l anandum i t  I s )
I have previously argued that, in the expression “τὰ ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς 
πράγμασιν” in 46a25, (i) the word “πράγματα” picks out explananda with predica-
tive form, (ii) the participle “ὑπάρχοντα” with dative complement is employed 
according to use (6) (with an implied hue of use [5]), namely, as pinpointing 
the proper features that are important to characterise the explananda as such. 
 31 See Eudemian Ethics, 1236a15–22.b21–26; Nicomachean Ethics, 1157a25–36.
 32 See, for instance, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123b29; Eudemian Ethics, 1217b9.
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Given this, if the adverb “ἀληθῶς” works as an intensifier in the way I have 
described above, it results that the whole expression “τὰ ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχοντα 
τοῖς πράγμασιν” picks out those features that, within a given discipline, are 
most fundamentally important to characterise each explanandum as the exact 
explanandum it is. 
A helpful clarification can result from one example previously given: why 
do quadrupeds move their limbs alternately (712a24ff.)? This explanandum has 
a predicative structure: quadrupeds is its subject-component, moving their limbs 
alternately is its predicate-component. Its identity as the explanandum it is de-
pends both on its subject-component and on its predicate-component. In sci-
entific research, there is a stage in which the researcher attains a better grasp of 
this identity – previously to the discovery of the appropriate causes that make 
it what it is.33 Now, in order to attain this better grasp of the explanandum as 
such, it is not good enough to amass the attributes that are true of quadrupeds 
(although this amassment might be useful). For some attributes that are true 
of quadrupeds might turn out to be unhelpful to attain a more accurate grasp 
of what the explanandum is – for instance, that quadrupeds are classified into 
oviparous and viviparous, that quadrupeds have lungs, that quadrupeds have a 
mouth etc. The researcher should seek for the attributes that, being true of the 
subject-term of the explanandum, have also some relevant connection with its 
predicate-component.34
 It is not easy to specify what a relevant connection amounts to, but this 
does not modify the story. The examples previously given (i.e., being classified 
into oviparous and viviparous, having lungs, having a mouth) do not qualify as 
relevantly connected to the predicate-component of the explanandum. In order 
to sort out relevant connections, one important factor is presumably to under-
stand the context in which the predicate-component of the explanandum raises 
as one determinate option among others. This involves understanding that what 
we wish to explain is (or at least includes), e.g., why quadrupeds do not progress 
by moving first their front limbs together, then their rear limbs together (or by 
moving first their right limbs together, then their left limbs together).35 Attrib-
 33 CHARLES 2000 has advocated a three-stage view about Aristotle’s scientific method. I do not 
need to discuss it, but my view is that, when we examine the details, we find that Aristotle’s 
scientific method involves more than three stages (each stage in Charles’ original story admits 
a filling up with details and subdivisions). 
 34 There is a striking similarity with the method prescribed by Galen, see HAVRDA (forth.)
 35 See Progression of Animals, 712a24–b13. As for the methodological point, see Posterior Analyt-
ics, II,8 93a33–35.
WHAT REALLY CHARACTERIZES EXPLANANDA: PRIOR AN ALY TICS , I,30
167
utes that are not only true of quadrupeds but also contribute to understand 
why those options would be worse for animal progression will be much more 
helpful to grasp what exactly is the explanandum in question.
Furthermore, among the attributes that contribute to attain a better grasp 
of what exactly is the explanandum in question, some might give a greater 
contribution than others. Two attributes can be enlightening about the nature 
of the explanandum, but being enlightening can come in gradations: one of 
those attributes can be more enlightening than the other. Thus, what Aristotle 
stresses with the adverb “ἀληθῶς” in 46a25 is that the success in finding out 
demonstrations depends on those attributes that are really (or most fundamen-
tally) enlightening about the nature of the explanandum, in other words, those 
attributes that are really important to characterise the explanandum in question 
as the explanandum it is.36
One might still say that Aristotle is too optimistic when he thinks that, if the 
researcher has identified attributes of this kind, it is easy to find out the explana-
tory factors on which appropriate demonstrations depend. However, it is clear 
that one will not be allowed to say that Aristotle’s optimism is naive or even 
silly. On the traditional interpretation of 46a22–27, the gap between gathering 
true predications and finding out the explanatory principles in a given domain 
risks to become a precipice – and the bridge over it seems to rest on an exag-
gerated trust in the powers of the deductive machinery. On my interpretation, 
the gap turns out to be a manageable distance, involving some difficulties of 
course, but in no way a mysterious gulf.
9 .  R e spond ing  some Obj ec t ion s
One might be tempted to raise the following objection. On my intepretation, 
the use of the expression “ὑπάρχοντα” shifts within the same chapter I,30, and 
that sounds “unnatural” and implausible. Indeed, at the beginning of the chap-
ter (46a5), “ὑπάρχει” and “ὑπάρχοντα” are used in the technical sense of “being 
attributed to”, and this sense plays an important part in the heuristic method 
 36 A possible objection: the selection of the relevant features to characterise each explanan-
dum seems to be a stage posterior to the “collection of facts” (ἱστορία). There is no room to discuss 
this point here, but I do not see any evidence to exclude such a selection from the ἱστορία. 
Besides, the expression “κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν” in 46a24 does not need to be taken in the sense 
of “in the investigation”: it can perfectly well be taken in the sense of “based on the investiga-
tion”.
LUCAS ANGIONI
168
delineated in the previous chapters. Thus – one might argue – it is highly implau-
sible that Aristotle would have employed “ὑπάρχοντα” just a few lines further 
ahead (46a23, 25) in a different way, with the force of “characteristic features”. 
Against this objection, I have three points. First, I respond that there is some 
confusion between two different things: on the one hand, the dodgy trick of 
slipping to different meanings of the same expression in order to dupe, on the 
other hand, the shift in the use of an expression within a short sequence of sen-
tences. Secondly, against the claim that shifts are implausible or unnatural “in 
principle”, I present a list of actual cases in which Aristotle does indeed shift 
the use of expressions within a short string of sentences. Thirdly, I argue that 
the shift in the use of “ὑπάρχοντα” in Prior Analytics I,30 is actually well fitted 
into the context of Aristotle’s discussion – to the point of being a welcome 
move. The first two points will be developed in this section, whereas section 10 
will discuss how Aristotle’s shift is appropriate in its context.
First, it is indeed not difficult to find in the literature some conflation be-
tween, on the one hand, the mere shift in the use of a term within a short se-
quence of sentences and, on the other hand, a specific kind of shifting that, 
occurring within the same argument, spoils its validity. The latter case can be 
intentional or not. It can be the sophistical trick of smuggling different mean-
ings of the same term into different premises of the same argument in order to 
produce a false semblance of validity, or it can be just the mistake of someone 
who does not detect the different meanings of the same expression in different 
premises and so “paralogizes” himself (cf. 175a10–12; 156a29). 
An easy example of the sophistical trick is the case that depends on two 
different meanings of “κύκλος”, namely, geometrical figure and epic cycle. The 
sophist proposes the question “is the circle [κύκλος] a geometrical figure?”, and 
the answer is easily “yes”; then (after a while), the sophist proposes the question 
“is the Iliad a κύκλος?” The answerer will say “yes”, based on the fact that the 
Iliad is an epic cycle. But then the sophist constrains the answerer to accept the 
(invalid) conclusion that “the Iliad is a geometrical figure”.37 
Of course, no serious discussion that depends on valid arguments can ac-
cept procedures of this sort, even when they are not intentionally produced. 
However, scholars sometimes are precipitate in conflating this unacceptable 
procedure and something that might look similar, but is different: the mere 
shift in the force (or meaning) of the same expression within a short string of 
sentences. Scholars are inclined to take for granted that, if an expression shifts 
 37 See Sophistical Refutations, 171a9–11; Posterior Analytics, 77b31–33.
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its meaning (or its referent, or its force) within a short string of sentences, then 
the validity and even the seriouness of the passage is damaged. However, what 
they forget to discuss (let alone to prove) is whether “a short string of sentences” 
is tantamount to “one and the same argument” – whether the two contexts in 
which the same expression occurs with different forces are actually premises of 
one and the same argument. Now, if we look closer to shifting occurrences in 
Aristotle’s works, we can see that most of the times the answer is negative: “a 
short string of sentences” is not tantamount to “one and the same argument”, 
and the two contexts in which the same expression occurs with different forces 
are not premises of one and the same argument.
A bunch of examples will prove helpful. Remember that, in Prior Analytics 
I,30, the occurrences of “ὑπάρχοντα” with different forces are separated by an 
interval of eighteen lines (46a5, then 46a23, 25). It is convenient to start with 
other cases involving the same verb “ὑπάρχει”. 
It is well known that “ὑπάρχει” with dative complement according to use 
(4), namely, in the technical sense of “being attributed to”, is profusely found 
in both Prior and Posterior Analytics. Take Posterior Analytics, I,4–5: Aristotle has 
resorted to use (4) of “ὑπάρχει” to characterise the notion of per se predication 
in 73a34.37.39; 73b4.10.19.30; 74a1.5.17.24.25.35.36.38.39; 74b3. Even if some of 
these seventeen occurrences might be controversial, my point is that the profuse 
employment of “ὑπάρχει” according to use (4) in Posterior Analytics, I,4–5 has not 
prevented Aristotle from using “ὑπάρχει” with dative complement in a different 
way in 74a10: “τοῖς γὰρ ἐν μέρει ὑπάρξει μὲν ἡ ἀπόδειξις”, which Barnes has 
translated as “the demonstration will indeed apply to the items etc.”. I believe 
it is beyond dispute that this occurrence of “ὑπάρξει” with dative complement 
does not even involve the typical relata of use (4), namely, subjects and predi-
cates, and must be translated as something like “apply”.38 
One might be tempted to protest that “this mess is not usual in Aristotle”. But 
I am afraid it is usual (although I do not think it deserves to be called a mess), as 
I will try to show with continuing the list. Another case with “ὑπάρχει” comes 
in due order. In Historia Animalium, I,6, there is a shift in two occurrences of 
the participle of “ὑπάρχειν” in an interval of three lines. In 491a9, “ὑπαρχούσας” 
modifies “διαφοράς”, and it is reasonable to take the dative “πᾶσι” as comple-
menting not only “συμβεβεκότα” but also “ὑπαρχούσας”. It might be disputed 
whether “ὑπαρχούσας” in 491a9 occurs according to use (6) – this is my view – 
 38 See other translations (Mignucci’s: “sarà delle cose”; Pellegrin’s: “portera sur”) and the 
paraphrasis in ROSS 1949, 523. For similar occurrences of “ὑπάρχει” with dative complement 
with the force of “apply”, see Metaphysics, 1088a8, 1030a21.
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or according to use (4), or even use (1). Thus, it might mean either “[differences] 
that are characteristic” (my view), or “[differences] that are true of their subjects”, 
or simply “[differences] that are real”.39 But the fact is that, just three lines further 
ahead, “ὑπαρχούσης” in the expression “ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας” in 491a12 is 
employed according to use (3), which Thompson’s translation attempted to en-
code with this: “when the investigation is complete.”40 Aristotle’s point is that the 
results of the investigation (ἱστορία) must be previously available for the method 
to follow its natural order. This is a different use of the same expression, but 
the competent reader reads them smoothly: there is no validity-spoiling shift.41
It would be boring to pursue this list too long. However, the opinion that 
shifting the use of an expression is unnatural (or sophistic) “in principle” is so 
entrenched that a few more examples will be useful (even if they do not give 
any decisive proof about Prior Analytics, I,30). In Prior Analytics I,32 Aristotle 
employs the word “ἀναγκαῖον” several times to mean something like “necessary 
consequence” (see 47a23.26.32.33.34.35). But this has not prevented him from 
using “ἀναγκαίων” in a different way just four lines before, in 47a19: namely, as 
an adjective qualifying the premises of an argument, with the force of “needed 
or required for the targeted conclusion” – which is actually how he has used 
the adjective “ἀναγκαία” in Topics, 155b19.20.29.36 ff.42
In Posterior Analytics, 79a18, “ἐπιστήμαι” was used with the force of scientific 
disciplines (such as geometry, arithmetic etc.), but just six lines ahead, in 79a24, 
“ἐπιστήμη” has the force of “cognition or grasp [of the definiens account of 
something]”. 
In Sophistical Refutations, 179a37, “πρᾶγμα” occurs as the correlate of 
“συμβεβηκός” in Aristotle’s discussion of the fallacy dependent on the sumbebe-
 39 CHARLES 2000, 315, understands historia as aimed at detecting “the relevant differentiating 
characteristics”, but prefers to take “ὑπαρχούσας” in 491a9 merely in the sense of “that exist”. 
Similarly, see LENNOx 2001b, 45, who translates “ὑπαρχούσας” as “present”.
 40 I guess this is also what LENNOx 2001a, 17, attempted to encode with “once” (“once there 
is an investigation etc.”).
 41 The occurrence of “ὑπαρχούσας” in 491a9 is a good reply to another possible objection, 
namely, that Aristotle does not seem to employ the expressions “ὑπάρχει” / “τὰ ὑπάρχοντα” 
with dative complement according to use (6) when conducting his own researches in the 
scientific treatises. But, actually, Aristotle has indeed resorted to use (6) when conducting 
his own investigations (besides 491a9): see Generation of Animals, 748a15; De Anima, 403b25 
(a possible parallel: Metaphysics, 1028b8); a similar case can be made for Physics, 208a34 (if a 
dative is implicit, Aristotle is talking about the features that properly characterize place), as well 
as for Parts of Animals, 644b30. 
 42 This shift is not controversial. See Smith’s and Striker’s translations. I am developing this 
point in a draft.
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kos. It does not matter whether the force of “πρᾶγμα” is exactly “subject of predi-
cation” or “the object we are concerned with as the target of the paralogism”, 
for it is anyway different from the force of “πρᾶγμα” just seven lines ahead, in 
179b5, where the word is applied to a statue and is equivalent to “κτῆμα” – to 
tell that it was not sculpted but only purchased by the answerer. (HASPER 2013 
translates “object” and “possession”, respectively).
Finally, in Metaphysics, X,2 1054a10, we have two occurrences of “φύσις” in 
the same line, but with different forces: (i) the first occurrence has the force of 
something like underlying thing, as is clear from other occurrences in the previous 
discussion in the same chapter (1053b26), (ii) but the second occurrence has the 
force of nature as equivalent to essence or essential being of something, as again is 
clear from the previous discussion in the same chapter (see 1053b35–1054a1). 
Now, in this case, the shift scandalizes purists so much that they tend to 
deny it. But actually the shift is part of the argument and sounds like a pun against 
some version of Platonism, which has claimed that (i) the One is a self-subsistent 
entity by being just this, One, and (ii) that the One is also the essential being of 
other things. Against the first point, Aristotle argues that we always says “one” 
of an underlying thing (i.e., φύσις, in 1053b26, cf. 1052b12), so that anything 
that is called “one” is inevitably called “one F” (where “F” is the sortal for the 
underlying thing): the one is not an underlying φύσις itself but always presup-
poses an underlying φύσις. This has a further consequence which becomes an 
objection against the second Platonist claim: the One, not being a self-subsistent 
thing by itself, cannot be the essential being (οὐσία in 1053b36, 1054a8, but φύσις 
in 1053b28 and indeed in 1054a10) of anything, including itself. In 1054a9–10, 
Aristotle recapitulates these two points: (i) what we take as one in any domain is 
actually one F (one φύσις), and (ii) the One itself cannot be the essence (φύσις) 
of anything. The fact that Aristotle uses the same word “φύσις” to make both 
points – to refer to the notion of an underlying thing F, and to refer to the 
notion of essential being of something – has a special flavour as a pun against 
his Platonic adversaries: “the One is not a φύσις by itself (rather, it always pre-
supposes a φύσις different from itself), nor can it be the φύσις of anything!” 
Why would we believe, instead, that such a shift in the two occurrences of the 
same word is validity-spoiling? Quite to the contrary, each occurrence within 
the same line is retrieving and recapitulating different arguments, against Pla-
tonic claims (i) and (ii), respectively. And, even if there is some important con-
nection between the two forces of “φύσις”, they are still distinct from each 
other.
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10 .  Conc lud ing  R emark s :  F i t t i ng  the  Pa s s age  
in to  I t s  Conte x t
In Prior Analytics I,30, there is no pun against adversaries. But the shift in the 
use of “ὑπάρχει” and “ὑπάρχοντα” is more than welcome in its context: it is 
actually well motivated by Aristotle’s discussion. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part (46a3–17) reca-
pitulates Aristotle’s heuristic recommendations for finding the principles of 
syllogisms in general (cf. 46a10–11). These recommendations refer back to the 
method depicted in I,28 and, in general, depend on the notion of a middle 
term, as developed in I,26. I do not need to discuss the details of that method.43 
It is enough for me to say that it is natural for Aristotle to employ “ὑπάρχει” 
and “ὑπάρχοντα” in this context according to use (4), namely, with the force 
of “being attributed to a subject in a predication”, for this part of the chapter 
is exclusively concerned with a deductive method for predicative relations.44 
However, the second part of the chapter (46a17–30) moves to a different point 
and deals with a more delicate matter. Aristotle is not any more considering the 
general principles of syllogisms from a formal, abstract and, most importantly, 
topic-neutral viewpoint. His new issue is how to find out the appropriate prin-
ciples of explanatory demonstrations within scientific disciplines. But instead 
of giving us a full-fledged account of the heuristic methodology for those ex-
planatory principles, Aristotle confines himself to a few points.
Actually, the second part of the chapter starts with a straightforward and 
compressed point (46a17). Aristotle stresses that, in most cases, the explanatory 
principles of scientific demonstrations must conform to each explanandum – 
that is, they must be sensitive to, and respond to, what exactly each explanan-
dum is. I take this to be the meaning of Aristotle’s key sentence at 46a17, which 
I read with Bekker: “ἰδίᾳ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον εἰσὶν αἱ πλεῖσται.” Aristotle employs 
the term “ἕκαστον” to refer to each explanandum within a given discipline, so 
that the expression “καθ᾽ ἕκαστον” is a predicate with the force of “in strict 
 43 For such a discussion, see STRIKER 2009, 195–201. 
 44 In general lines, the method expounded in Prior Analytics I,26–29 follows the deductive ma-
chinery based on the categorical forms of Aristotle’s syllogistic. In Prior Analytics I,27 43b1–11, 
Aristotle adds predicative relations that go a little bit further, namely, the definitions and the 
propria. However, definitions and propria might still be insufficient to settle the appropriate 
principles for a given explanandum. If one is to explain (e.g.) why quadrupeds are long-lived, 
it would be helpful to collect their propria and to identify their definitions, but even so there 
might be something decisively missing in the explanatory story. See ANGIONI 2016, 152–161. 
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conformity to each [explanandum]” or “on the basis of each [explanandum]”.45 
Thus, this is my translation with paraphrasis of Aristotle’s compressed point: 
“particularly [i.e., within a particular domain], most of the [explanatory] princi-
ples conform to each explanandum.” It is this point that will be substantiated 
in the key passage I started with, 46a22–27. But before arriving at that passage, 
Aristotle develops a consequence of his compressed point – in the famous pas-
sage about astronomical experience (46a17–22). 
Differently from standard interpretations, I do not take this famous passage 
(46a17–22) as making exactly the same point made in 46a22–27. On my view, 
Aristotle is just developing a consequence of his remark that explanatory prin-
ciples must conform to each explanandum. Given his point, it follows that ex-
planatory principles of scientific demonstrations are not a topic-neutral issue.46 
Inasmuch as they must conform to each explanandum, explanatory principles 
depend on the nature of the subject-matter – and this dependence is enough to 
settle that empirical acquaintance with the appropriate domain is required to at-
tain them. This is what Aristotle is emphasising when he says that empeiria is in 
charge of handing down the principles to the scientist (in the sense of bringing 
the principles to the science’s court).47 In order to attain the explanatory prin-
ciples, it is not enough to rely on the abstract and general method portrayed in 
the previous chapters and resumed in the fist part of I,30 – a method which is 
basically a topic-neutral deductive machinery. But this remark – that a scientist 
must have empirical acquaintance with a particular domain, besides mastering 
the deductive method – does not imply that empeiria is able to do all that is 
needed to attain the explanatory principles on which demonstrations depend.48
 45 Unfortunately, the full discussion of this interpretation would require a different paper. 
 46 As highlighted by LENNOx 2011, 28.
 47 The verb “παραδοῦναι” need not be taken in the sense of “furnish”, “provide”. The same 
verb covers (e.g.) the action of delivering a prisoner to the court – and Aristotle seems to be 
resorting to a similar force of the verb. This interpretation is compatible with the epistemic 
reach Aristotle usually attributes to empeiria. Far from being able to establish the principles, 
empeiria just collect the phainomena and is not able to tell the causes (see HASPER – YURDIN 
2014, 125–126). Even if the phainomena can include what seems to be an explanatory principle 
at that stage, whether those phainomena are the appropriate principles is an issue to be settled 
in a higher court of scientific expertise.
 48 Contrary to standard interpretations, I do not take Aristotle’s remarks at 46a20–21 as 
equivalent to his claim at 46a22–27. There is no room to discuss whether “φαινόμενα” (46a20) 
is equivalent to “ὑπάρχοντα” (46a23.25). Unfortunately, I must skip this issue. It is enough for 
me to argue that the whole message of 46a20–21 is simple: Aristotle just says that a satisfactory 
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Thus, in my initial passage (46a22–27), Aristotle is going further than this 
– resuming the main point announced in 46a17. Explanatory principles within 
each discipline are those that stick to what each explanandum is. Consequently, 
in order to attain them, the researcher must aim at identifying those attributes 
that are really important to characterise each explanandum as the explanandum 
it is. Now, this is a more exacting step in scientific research, which goes further 
than having empeiria with the appropriate domain.
This surveying of the overall structure of the chapter helps us understand 
how Aristotle’s shifting language is suited to its context. The passage (46a5) in 
which “ὑπάρχει” and “ὑπάρχοντα” were employed according to use (4) belongs 
to a part of the discussion that has terminated in 46a17. Thus, Aristotle can feel 
perfectly comfortable to employ “ὑπάρχοντα” according to use (6) in 46a23.25. 
But there is more than mere comfort. It is somehow convenient for Aristotle 
to phrase his point in 46a22–27 in the way he has phrased it. He starts with an 
expression (“τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον”, 46a23) which resembles the one em-
ployed in the beginning of the chapter (“τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἑκάτερον”, 46a5), 
when he recapitulated the abstract method for finding the principles of syllo-
gisms. But the resemblance of the expressions is superficial. There, “ἑκάτερον” 
was referring to the terms (both subject and predicate) of a problem within the 
framework of the general method developed in the previous chapters. On its 
turn, “ἕκαστον” in 46a23 refers to the notion of an explanandum with predica-
tive form.49 There, Aristotle was only concerned with finding middle terms for 
deductions. But from 46a17, Aristotle is concerned with explanations – which 
are deductions in which the middle term must capture what is appropriately 
explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, in order to make his point clearer, Aris-
totle rephrases it, in 46a24–25, with a more emphatic language: “πράγματα” 
replaces “ἕκαστον”, and the key expression “ὑπάρχοντα”, employed according 
collection of phainomena is a sine qua non condition for finding out explanatory demonstra-
tions – but this does not imply that a satisfactory collection of phainomena would be sufficient 
to attain the explanatory demonstrations. I thank an anonymous referee, István Bodnar and 
François Nolle for stressing this issue.
 49 There is a further objection against the traditional way of taking “πράγματα” (46a25) and 
“ἕκαστον” (46a23) in the sense of subject of predication (or subject-matter): not even in the 
topic-neutral deductive method recapitulated at 46a3–17 one should focus only on the subject 
of predication. As Aristotle makes clear, the method is problem-sensitive, so that one must col-
lect list of terms connected with the predicate of the problem too – and this is encoded in the 
use of “ἑκάτερον” (i.e., each of the two terms of the problem, the subject and the predicate) at 
46a5. Now, if one must pay attention to both terms of the problem even in the topic-neutral 
deductive method, why one should limit herself to “the attributes of the subject” when the 
issue is the more complicated task of finding explanations? 
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to uses (6) and (5), is modified with the intensifier “ἀληθῶς”. Aristotle attempts 
to clarify that his point is not focused on all the predicates that are merely true 
of their subjects: he is now talking about the most important subset of them, 
namely, those predicates that introduce features really important to characterise 
each explanandum as the exact explanandum it is. 
In this picture, it is fair to say that, if our investigation collects a sufficient 
number of features of that kind, our path towards the explanatory principles 
will be easier. 
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Summary
In Prior Analytics, I,30, Aristotle seems much too optimistic about finding out 
the scientific principles. He seems to say that, if our empirical collection of facts 
in a given domain is exhaustive or sufficient, it will be easy for us to discover 
the explanatory principles in the domain. However, there is a distance between 
collecting facts and finding out the explanatory principles in a given domain. 
In this paper, I discuss how the key expression in the sentence at 46a25 should 
be interpreted: “the true characteristics of things” (τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς 
πράγμασιν). I argue that, on a more accurate interpretation of the expression, 
Aristotle’s point would cease to look like a piece of naïve or even silly optimism.
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